The Federal Court of Accounts and his non-competence to determine retention of payments in administrative contracts

The Federal Court of Accounts and his non-competence to determine retention of payments in administrative contracts

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.48143/RDAI.14.ggn

Abstract

The adoption, by the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU – Brazil), of a provisional measure of retention payments due to contracted in administrative contracts is not covered by the Brazilian constitutional order. Retaining payments, even if partially, is nothing more than to halt the financial execution of the contract. And the original competence to suspend administrative contracts is the Brazilian National Congress (FC, art. 71, § 1º). Obliging the contracted party to perform the same physical object for a pecuniary compensation inferior to the one proposed in the bidding process disrespects still the art. 37, XXI, of the Federal Constitution, which ensures the maintenance of the effective conditions of the proposal presented. Moreover, even the Brazilian National Congress would not have the constitutional power to partially suspend the financial execution of the administrative contract (as in the case of retentions). It is only up to him to stop the administrative contract in its entirety, in the physical and financial dimensions together.

Author Biography

Giuseppe Giamundo Neto, Universidade de São Paulo (São Paulo, São Paulo, Brasil)

Doutorando e Mestre em Direito do Estado pela Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Advogado em São Paulo. giuseppe@giamundoneto.com.br

 

Published

2020-07-10

How to Cite

GIAMUNDO NETO, Giuseppe. The Federal Court of Accounts and his non-competence to determine retention of payments in administrative contracts: The Federal Court of Accounts and his non-competence to determine retention of payments in administrative contracts. Journal of Public Law and Infrastructure | RDAI, São Paulo: Thomson Reuters | Livraria RT, v. 4, n. 14, p. 341–358, 2020. DOI: 10.48143/RDAI.14.ggn. Disponível em: https://rdai.com.br/index.php/rdai/article/view/233. Acesso em: 22 dec. 2024.

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Articles