Economic infrastructure, state and market: tensions and intersections according to the economic regulation theory

Infraestrutura econômica, estado e mercado: tensões e interseções segundo a teoria econômica da regulação

Abstract

The relations between state and market are given special attention by theorists of state regulation of market activities. Economists at the Chicago School made efforts to identify the state's pattern of intervention in the economy through regulatory activity. Among them, George Stigler assumes importance in the construction of the so called Economic Regulation Theory, by which the state regulatory activity is evidenced as a product of the influence of the most empowered economic actors of the market. Stigler understands that it is evident that state decisions in regulation are fraught with biases of bias, so that the regulatory phenomenon diagnoses the links between state and market to obtain reciprocal advantages - tensions and intersections - to the detriment of social interest. For no other reason Vital Moreira announces as illusory the conception of division between state and market and denounces the existence of the phenomenon of "state economization and economic statization". Considering the perspectives of the Economic Theory of Regulation, this article intends to foment concerns about the state economic-regulatory infrastructure, as well as about the state regulatory decisions, characterized by a technical and complex discretion. In addition, it aims to situate the problem of state decisionism, legitimized by normativism, in the context of economic underdevelopment and the state apparatus, characterized by power disputes and interests between state and market, and its reflexes for what is known as capitalist state regulator. For that, a bibliographical revision of the doctrine was carried out, especially that related to the Economic Theory of Regulation, using the deductive method.