Judicial review of the limits of administrative discretion: examination of the motives or assumptions underlying the act – the notion of “cause” as a requirement of legality

Abstract

This study examines the limits of judicial review of discretionary administrative acts, with particular attention to the possibility of assessing the motives, factual assumptions, and purposes that condition the validity of administrative action. The analysis distinguishes administrative discretion from legality and argues that the existence of a margin of choice granted to public authorities does not exclude judicial review of the legally binding elements of administrative acts. The article discusses the use of indeterminate legal concepts and the need to preserve their minimum core meaning, compliance with which may be reviewed by the Judiciary without improperly interfering with administrative merit. It also develops the notion of “cause” as the relationship of adequacy between the factual assumptions of an administrative act and its object, requiring logical congruence between the empirical circumstances underlying the decision and the content of the measure adopted. The discussion is applied to the requirement of urgency for convening extraordinary sessions of a Municipal Council. The study concludes that courts may examine the actual occurrence of factual assumptions established by law, including urgency, provided that judicial review remains confined to legal parameters and to the core meaning of the concepts employed by legislation.