The Courts of Audit and control of déficit public policies

Abstract

Abstract: 

The control of public policies by the courts of audit has always given way to countless legal debates regarding their assumptions and limits, mainly in order to encompass a larger field for the exercise of administrative discretion in the definition of goals, guidelines, priorities and government plans to attain the public interest. The exercise of this important control activity is not at the heart of the problem, considering that in the current rule of law model there are no more fields immune to the reach of the law, which includes politics itself, especially when dealing with deficit public policies, resulting from structural failures of the Public Power to protect and promote fundamental rights. The merit of the discussions is in the analysis of the state of things, by the external control bodies, and in the search for the actualization of deficit public policies through an institutional dialogue between the competent public authorities, thus avoiding structural interventions and activism without carrying out a broad democratic debate, under the bias of consequentiality, allowing the achievement of good practical results and privileging the institutional balance proper to a democratic government and with constitutionally separate powers.